The Abstracts of Vol.4,2015
Releasing Time：07.16.2015Source：
An Analysis of U.S. Department of State Report — China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea
Lin Zhen
On 5th December 2014, the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs under the U.S. Department of State issued “Limits in the Seas, No. 143—China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, which comments on the possible nature of the U-shaped line drawn by China in the South China Sea. If the general background is taken into consideration, this act has a strong implication on the pending arbitration brought up by the Philippines against China. Seemingly objective and impartial, Report No.143 tries to portray Chinese legitimate rights as an excessive and unfounded claim. To achieve this goal, the report has misinterpreted, to a large extent, the international law, including the law of the sea. The present article aims at pointing out the mistakes in the argumentation of Report No.143 and correcting the wrongs.
Between the Middle Power Dream and the National Interest
—Australia’s International Strategy and its South China Sea Policy
Lu Peng
This article highlights the idealistic and realistic dimensions of Australia’s international strategy. It firstly reviews the evolution of Australia’s middle power strategy, which reflects an idealized understanding of the distinctive image as well as the role of Australia in the international society. It then focuses on Australia’s national security strategy, which is categorized into four to five levels of national security interest and reflects politicians’ realistic understanding of geopolitics. The article finally offers a brief interpretation of Australia’s South China Sea policy which has experienced dramatic change in recent years. It argues that the change of Australia’s South China Sea policy is a result of Australia’s pursuit of its middle power identity in the Asia-Pacific regional international relations in the 21st century when its national security is sufficiently guaranteed by the U.S.
Getting Deeply Involved in the South China Sea Dispute: How Far Will Japan Go?
Zhu Qingxiu
Japan’s stance on the South China Sea dispute has experienced substantial changes and development since the Cold War. In the Cold War era, Japan’s South China Sea policy was consistent with that of the United States. In the 1990s, Japan began to intervene in the South China Sea dispute, sometimes inexplicitly. Entering the new millennium, Japan paid full attention to every move in the South China Sea which, starting in 2010, was transformed into comprehensive intervention. Japan’s current active engagement in the South China Sea serves two purposes. On the one hand, Japan attempts to drag China into the consuming quagmire of maritime dispute by binding together the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes. On the other hand, Japan wants to increase its influence and control over the strategic maritime channel linking the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea as part of its efforts to boost the transformation of national maritime strategy. Japan’s South China Sea policy further complicates the South China Sea dispute and creates additional obstacle for China to find a peaceful resolution. In response, China needs to strengthen exchanges and cooperation with littoral countries in the South China Sea region, squeeze the space for Japan’s strategic maneuver and create favorable conditions for reaching a peaceful resolution of the dispute.
Nuclear Deterrence, Interdependence and Theory of Peace between Great Powers
Stein Tønnesson
Nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence are key factors in cost calculations underpinning decisions for war and peace. This essay combines deterrence and interdependence in a proposed theory of major power peace, with reference to a number of insightful recent works on the ongoing transition of power from the US to a rising China. The essay explores the hypothesis that as long as the US and China can deter each other with a combination of conventional and nuclear forces, and refrain from actions to drastically reduce their economic dependence on each other, there is little risk of war between them. Peace will be further secured if important third countries, notably Japan, remain covered by US extended deterrence and integrated economically with both China and the US through trade and transnational production chains. Only if the US, Chinese or Japanese governments take politically motivated actions to radically reduce their economic dependence on one another are they likely to engage in a security competition of sufficient intensity to generate an arms race and a substantial risk of war. This does not just hold for all-out war but for limited war as well, given the risk of escalation.
Sino-US-Russia Relations in Light of Game Theory: Their Latest Trends and China’s Planning Methods
Jia Chunyang Chen Yu
In recent years, the Sino-US-Russia relations have witnessed some new trends, which are reflected in changes of the power distribution among these three countries, changes of their inside and outside situation, and changes of the international environment. These new developments in the trilateral relations, when interacting with changes of the international environment, have brought some new characteristics to great power relations and the world order. Looking forward, China should recognize the changing trends of Sino-US-Russia Relations properly and accurately identify both the common concerns and differences of interests with the U.S. and Russia. Based on this understanding as well as China’s own diplomatic strategy and national interests, China should play an active role in planning and shaping amicable Sino-US-Russia Relations, thus creating a favorable environment for the unfolding of a new landscape of diplomacy as well as the implementation of “One Belt One Road” strategy.
The Legacy of Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Present Phenomenon of Historical Revisionism in Japan
Li Ruoyu
Japan’s War of Aggression against the Asia continent was unfolded by the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895. To a certain extent, this war shaped the war ideology of modern Japan. Since the end of World War II, Japan expressed many times its willingness to reflect on its past, but it has consistently avoided using “aggression” to define the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 in history textbooks. The farce of Japanese history textbooks can be attributed to the manipulation of Japanese right-wing politicians, with whom the incumbent Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has close relationship. Abe’s connection with right-wing political organizations explains his assertion that “the definition of what constitutes aggression has yet to be established in academia or in the international community” as well as his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, and reflects vividly his views on war and history.
The Role of Water Diplomacy in the Implementation of China’s “One Belt One Road” Strategy
Guo Yanjun
In recent years, the controversy over trans-boundary water resources has become more prominent, and has gradually evolved into an influential factor in shaping China’s relations with neighboring countries. Given the fact that this issue will inevitably encountered by China in its implementation of the “One Belt One Road” strategy, China needs to take a more proactive approach, using water diplomacy to dampen tensions and solve the disputes. This article chooses two cases, the negotiation on Sino-Kazakhstan trans-boundary water disputes and the management of Mekong River water resources, to review and evaluate China’s current approach of water diplomacy. It proposes that, to better manage cross-border water disputes, China should incorporate the latest development of international water diplomacy, employ a case-by-case approach compatible with the different nature of water disputes in different regions, and swiftly modify its approach at both bilateral and regional levels, thus paving the way for the successful implementation of “One Belt One Road” project.
Hydropower Development in the Mekong River: Its Impacts on the Situation in the Region
Building hydropower dams on the Mekong River has a far-reaching impact and may bring problems such as anomalous changes to the water level, aggravated river erosion, fish depletion and other ecological problems. Concerns over these environmental and food security challenges contributed to the opposition of relevant countries to these hydropower projects. Regional countries have tried to solve their conflict of interests over water resources allocation and dam building through diplomatic means, but the result is not encouraging. Tensions over this issue have already had a negative impact on regional peace, security and cooperation. In the future, the issue of hydropower development in the Mekong River may become one of the key factors affecting peace and stability in the Southeast Asia sub-continent.